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SETTING THE STANDARD FOR “NEUTRAL” 
ARBITRATORS:  THE RISK OF EVIDENT PARTIALITY 





The use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and particularly 
arbitration, has grown in tandem with the delays and costs of litigating 
in overburdened state and federal court systems, but that rise in 
popularity has not come without a cost.  Although arbitration may often 
be a preferable alternative to a full-blown court trial, the inconsistency 
and insufficiency of existing disclosure requirements for arbitrators in 
many states limits the ability of parties to make an informed evaluation 
as to the risk or existence of potential bias.  The recent Monster Energy 
case out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
begun to change the landscape for disclosure requirements for 
arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act, but unless state 
legislatures agree to implement disclosure requirements for arbitrators 
that allow the parties to accurately evaluate the risk of partiality 
themselves, ADR will not reach its potential as a more accessible and 
equally fair alternative to the court system.  The Federal Arbitration Act 
and several state statutes impose disclosure requirements on arbitrators, 
but the issue of “evident partiality” arising from the potential economic 
motivations of arbitrators has rarely been examined by the courts.  The 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling has put the spotlight on the need for arbitrators to 
disclose any potential financial interest or stake they may have in the 
outcome of an action. 
While the issue had not received much attention prior to Monster 
Energy, there has been growing concern in the legal community over the 
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potential abuse and partiality permitted under the current disclosure 
requirements for arbitrators, particularly in light of the surge in 
arbitration clauses, and the disparate economic influence wielded by 
“repeat players” in the arbitration system.  Given the private nature of 
ADR providers, it is to be expected that the rules applicable to 
arbitrators differ from Article III judges.  However, as discussed in 
Monster Energy and Justice White’s concurring opinion in 
Commonwealth Coatings, parties to an arbitration should be made 
aware of all of the arbitrator’s non-trivial business dealings that may 
hinder the fairness of the process, including whether there are any 
financial incentives that might cause a reasonable party concern that an 
arbitrator could favor one party over another.  Arbitration will continue 
to grow in popularity, highlighting the need to establish strict and 
unambiguous disclosure requirements to enable all participants in 
arbitration to evaluate the economic interests of potential arbitrators, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal disputes are a familiar concept to many Americans, but the 
variety of methods employed to solve them is evolving, requiring a 
closer look at how these alternative methods may impact the integrity of 
the dispute resolution system.  Despite what popular television shows 
and movies may suggest, real life litigation rarely takes place inside a 
courtroom.  The vast majority of legal disputes are resolved without a 
trial.1  A growing number of these disputes are being settled outside of 
the court system entirely, in the form of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR).2  There are several types of ADR, but they all generally involve 
bringing in a neutral third party to help bring about a resolution with less 
time and resources expended at trial.3 
As legal disputes trend away from the court system and towards 
arbitration and other forms of ADR,4 the role and potential bias of the 
third party involved in the dispute resolution must be considered.  In 
many jurisdictions, it has not been clear whether an arbitrator is subject 
to the same or similar rules of disclosure and recusal as trial judges, 
creating a growing need for clarity as to how the courts ought to 
approach the issue and what types and level of disclosure parties should 
expect from potential arbitrators.  One of the most pertinent issues 
affecting potential arbitrators is Repeat Player Bias, which refers to the 
symbiotic relationship between an arbitrator and a repeat customer of 
their services, leading to the potential for an arbitrator to favor this repeat 
player for business purposes at the expense of the other party to the 
dispute.5  In Monster Energy Company v. City Beverages,6 the Ninth 
Circuit provided meaningful guidance as to the nexus between the 
generalized disclosure requirements for arbitrators and the particular 
impact of Repeat Player Bias.7  The court vacated an arbitration award 
because the arbitrator had failed to disclose that he had a “substantial” 
 
 1. Government survey shows 97 percent of civil cases settled, PHX. BUS. J. (May 27, 
2004), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2004/05/31/newscolumn5.html (citing a 
U.S. Justice Department study of state courts) (“About 97 percent of civil cases are settled or 
dismissed without a trial.”). 
 2. Bradley A. Kletscher, Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) Trends: The Growth 
and Prevalence of ADR in Litigation, BARNA, GUZY & STEFFEN LTD. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2009), 
https://www.bgs.com/blog/2009/12/13/alternative-dispute-resolution-adr-trends-the-growth-
and-prevalence-of-adr-in-litigation/ [hereinafter ADR Trends]. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See generally Drew J. Hushka, How Nice to See You Again: The Repetitive Use of 
Arbitrators and the Risk of Evident Partiality, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 325 (2013), 
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=arbitrationlawreview. 
 6. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 7. See id. 
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ownership interest in the ADR provider in that case, and that provider 
had “nontrivial” past business dealings with one of the litigants (Monster 
Energy).8 
This Article aims to highlight the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Monster Energy, and to discuss its significance to the legal profession 
and potential litigants.  In Part II, this Article will give a brief overview 
of the growth of arbitration in the United States, the general disclosure 
and conflict rules applicable to arbitrators, and the factual background 
of Monster Energy.  Parts III and IV will discuss the issue of Repeat 
Player Bias and analyze the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in the case.  Part V 
will suggest that a strict standard for required disclosures of arbitrators, 
similar to the Ninth Circuit’s in Monster Energy, should be applied 
universally and unambiguously through state law and court rulings to 
ensure fairness in arbitration proceedings and to give parties the tools 
necessary to provide adequately informed consent to the resolution of 
their disputes outside of the court system.  While this Article addresses 
ADR generally, emphasis will be placed on arbitration in civil cases for 
the sake of simplicity and relevance to the Monster Energy case. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. What is Alternative Dispute Resolution? 
ADR is generally defined as any attempt to resolve a legal dispute 
outside of court.9  While accurate, this definition fails to paint a clear 
picture of what that process actually looks like.  Technically, even a one-
off offer to settle could be considered a form of ADR given that it is a 
form of negotiation aimed at resolving the dispute.  As a direct 
alternative to trial, ADR is generally voluntary for all parties involved 
and a neutral third party will be brought in to promote impartiality.10 
ADR exists in many forms, each with its own process and nuance.  
Two of the most common types of ADR are mediation and arbitration.11  
This Article will focus on arbitration because it is one of the few forms 
of ADR in which the third-party neutral may have the power to render a 
binding adjudication of the parties’ dispute, so that the risks of potential 
bias, and the parties’ resulting interests in procuring full and accurate 
disclosures, are most acute. 
 
 8. See id. at 1132, 1135-36. 
 9. What is ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION?, L. DICTIONARY, 
https://thelawdictionary.org/alternative-dispute-resolution/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 10. Id. 
 11. ADR Types & Benefits, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/3074.htm (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2021). 
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Although both mediation and arbitration involve a third-party 
neutral to assist with the dispute, they differ in the specific role and 
function of the third-party neutral.12  Where a mediator will simply 
facilitate discussion between the parties, an arbitrator or a panel of 
multiple arbitrators will ultimately decide the outcome of the dispute.13  
In this sense, arbitration proceedings operate similarly to trial.  The 
arbitrator(s) hear arguments from both sides, and the parties may submit 
evidence for the arbitrator to consider.14  While there are some 
similarities to trial, the arbitration process differs by operating less 
formally and by loosening the rules of evidence for the sake of 
efficiency.15  In addition, the effect of the arbitrator’s decision may 
operate differently from a judge or jury’s decision at trial.16 
An arbitration proceeding can be “binding” or “nonbinding.”17  In 
the typical binding arbitration, the parties agree to accept the arbitrator’s 
decision as final,18 and the right to appeal the substance of that decision 
is extremely limited.19  In other types of arbitrations, the parties may 
agree that the arbitrator’s decision is not binding.20  In those matters, 
either party may reject the decision and proceed to trial.21  Binding 
arbitration is best for those who wish to avoid the formality, time, and 
cost of trial.22  For both types of arbitration, litigants are given the 
opportunity to select a decision maker who possesses more specialized 
knowledge in a particular area of the law or other subject matter that 
makes them a better fit to adjudicate the dispute.23 
Other forms of ADR, such as neutral evaluation and settlement 
conferences, each contain their own benefits and drawbacks when 
compared to their counterparts,24 but arbitration best exemplifies the 
alluring features of ADR, and has generated a significant amount of trust 
and practice of ADR nationwide.25 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. ADR Types & Benefits, supra note 11. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. ADR Types & Benefits, supra note 11. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Linda L. Beyea, Select the Right Arbitrator for Your Case, AAA-ICDR® BLOG (Dec. 
10, 2019), https://adr.org/blog/select-the-right-arbitrator-for-your-case. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See generally Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation: What’s the Difference?, FIND 
L., https://www.findlaw.com/adr/mediation/mediation-vs-arbitration-vs-litigation-whats-the-
difference.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2019). 
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1. Prevalence 
The growth of ADR is likely the culmination of many contributing 
factors, but its appeal stems largely from its lower cost, less daunting 
procedures compared to its trial counterpart, the parties’ freedom to 
choose the arbitrator(s) and create their own schedule, and the desire to 
avoid a jury panel and class actions.  Although ADR in its basic form is 
not a new concept, its mainstream use began in response to the litigation 
explosion of the past few decades.26 
In an attempt to address growing caseloads and a lack of resources, 
courts began to promote ADR to lessen the burden placed on them.27  
Consequently, ADR is often viewed as a more efficient alternative for 
the parties involved, while reducing case overload for courts thanks to 
ADR proliferation.28  Even the United States Courts’ website encourages 
the use of ADR, asserting that it saves both parties unnecessary expense 
and delay.29 
One of the key features of ADR is that it may be used in conjunction 
with litigation.30  Not only is this potentially advantageous for parties to 
a dispute, it is also in the interest of the courts to have prospective 
litigants attempt to resolve their dispute before calling upon the often 
limited resources of the court system to resolve it.31  In response, some 
courts, bar associations, and state legislatures have begun providing 
ADR resources or requirements to promote the use of ADR before 
commencing trial.32 
For example, the Santa Clara County Superior Court website 
contains an “ADR Resources” page that includes: a list of local ADR 
providers, a phone number and email address to inform and prepare 
parties for ADR, contact information for free mediation services in some 
types of disputes, and additional links to other resources.33  Not only is 
 
 26. ADR Trends, supra note 2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Civil Cases, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-
cases/civil-cases (last visited Apr. 26, 2021) (“To avoid the expense and delay of having a 
trial, judges encourage the litigants to try to reach an agreement resolving their dispute. The 
courts encourage the use of mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, designed to produce a resolution of a dispute without the need for trial or other 
court proceedings.”). 
 30. Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 25. 
 31. See Miranda Blue, In Overcrowded Courts, Justice Delayed, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY 
(Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.pfaw.org/blog-posts/in-overcrowded-courts-justice-delayed/. 
 32. See, e.g., Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 25; see also ADR 
Resources, SUPERIOR CT. CAL. COUNTY SANTA CLARA, 
https://www.scscourt.org/self_help/civil/adr/adr_resources.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2021) 
[hereinafter Santa Clara County ADR Resources]. 
 33. Santa Clara County ADR Resources, supra note 32. 
 
2021] SETTING THE STANDARD FOR “NEUTRAL” ARBITRATORS 845 
it commonplace to find a plethora of ADR resources online that make 
the process easier for potential litigants, some jurisdictions require or 
strongly encourage participation in ADR before allowing a case to be 
heard at trial.34  Florida requires parties in a wide variety of legal disputes 
to attempt to reach a resolution through mediation or arbitration before 
they can begin trial.35  With the numerous benefits arbitration provides 
for litigants and the legal system, it will likely continue growing. 
2. Making Sense of the Numbers 
All signs indicate that there is a strong likelihood ADR will, at the 
very least, remain an effective and more accessible alternative to 
litigation.  But just how common is ADR?  Statistics are frequently 
thrown around regarding the percentage of cases that settle or go to trial, 
but it can be difficult to generate precise numbers.  A common 
misconception is that about ninety-five percent of cases settle, but, 
despite the significant variation among research methods, a more 
accurate estimate is that about two-thirds of civil cases settle.36  The 
remarkably high rate does not come from settlement rates but is instead 
based on the number of cases that go to trial in the first place.37 
Some of the more telling statistics are those involving case filings.  
While reliable statistics concerning the number of cases that settle are 
hard to come by,38 the number of case filings in the U.S. is well 
documented.39  The number of cases filed in state trial courts increased 
steadily into the mid-2000s.40  Following the 2008 economic crisis, 
average case filings increased at a more rapid pace.41  However, this 
trend was short-lived, declining at an average of three point five percent 
for the next several years.42  The number of case filings between 2014 
 
 34. See, e.g., Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 25. 
 35. F.S.A. § 718.1255 (West 2020). 
 36. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care? 6 CORNELL L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS 111, 112, 115 (2009). 
 37. John Barkai et al., A Profile of Settlement, 42 AM. JUDGES ASS’N CT. REV. 34, 34 
(2006), https://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr42-3and4/CR42-3BarkaiKentMartin.pdf (“Many 
commentators start with an accurate picture of low, single-digit trial rates (typically 2%-3%), 
but then they inappropriately assume the inverse—namely, that all the remaining cases are 
settled.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.; see, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015), 
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/29818/2015-EWSC.pdf 
[hereinafter EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS]. 
 40. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 39, at 4. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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and 2019 were much more erratic, but the population-adjusted numbers 
still appear to be going down.43 
Some argue that one of the main driving forces behind the growth 
of ADR stems from the pervasiveness of mandatory arbitration clauses.44  
An arbitration clause is defined as “[a] clause inserted in a contract 
providing for compulsory arbitration in case of dispute as to [rights] or 
liabilities under it.”45  In essence, an arbitration clause requires the 
parties to a contract containing the clause to participate in arbitration 
should any legal dispute arise out of the terms of the contract.46  While 
arbitration clauses cannot constitute waiver of a court’s jurisdiction 
entirely, they nonetheless may significantly limit one’s ability to resolve 
the dispute at trial.47  One of the primary uses of arbitration clauses is 
insertion into employment contracts.48  Employers may be inclined to 
include arbitration clauses in their employment contracts in recognition 
of, and in response to, the ability to control their employment disputes 
in an environment that gives them a better chance of obtaining a 
favorable outcome.49  For example, California has one of the highest 
rates of arbitration clauses in employment contracts and also has an 
employee-protective legal structure.50 
Given that many arbitration clauses in employment contracts 
involve opting out of the state court system, the inference is that one of 
the primary motivations in including arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts is to nullify many of the legal protections employees would 
otherwise have, including the right to a jury trial.51  This practice by 
 
 43. See U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS – NATIONAL JUDICIAL 
CASELOAD PROFILE, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0930.2019.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2021); see also National Population Totals and Components of Change: 
2010-2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-national-total.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 44. See generally Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/144131.pdf; see also Daniel 
T. Pascucci, Dissecting Common Basic Arbitration Clauses – You Can Build a Better One, 
MINTZ (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2196/2018-03-
dissecting-common-basic-arbitration-clauses-you-can-build. 
 45. What is ARBITRATION CLAUSE?, L. DICTIONARY, 
https://thelawdictionary.org/arbitration-clause/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 46. See Colvin, supra note 44, at 1. 
 47. What is ARBITRATION CLAUSE?, supra note 45. 
 48. See Colvin, supra note 44, at 1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 7. 
 51. See id. at 12 (“Rather than having their rights adjudicated through the public courts 
and decided by juries of their peers, more often now American workers have to bring claims 
. . . through arbitral forums designated by agreements that their own employers drafted and 
required them to agree to as a condition of employment.”). 
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employers has received criticism for its unfair treatment of employees 
due to the complexity and prevalence of arbitration clauses in the 
employment contracts of large-scale employers, limiting people’s ability 
to avoid and understand them.52  Employers might counter by arguing 
that they include arbitration clauses in their employment contracts for 
promoting efficiency and decreasing the costs for all parties involved, to 
the disadvantage of no one.53  Regardless of the reason, the frequent 
inclusion of arbitration clauses in employment contracts has attracted a 
greater amount of attention to ADR, and followed with implementation 
of several restrictions regarding their use with the possibility of 
additional restrictions in the future.54  The pervasiveness of mandatory 
arbitration clauses is a separate major source of debate within the legal 
community that deserves its own discussion, but is nonetheless worth 
introducing here to provide a better understanding of how ADR directly 
impacts litigation in the United States.55 
In any event, there is no question that arbitration is more prevalent 
now than before, and that trend does not appear to be changing anytime 
soon.56  However, as the popularity of arbitration grows, so too does the 
risk of abuse and prejudice.57 
B. Evolution of Arbitration 
Having discussed ADR with a focus on arbitration, its forms, and 
its prevalence, the next step is to consider the arbitrators themselves: 
who are they?  Where do they come from?  What rules govern their 
selection? 
1. Who Are the Main Service Providers? 
The demand for legal experts to resolve disputes through ADR has 
led to the formation of numerous ADR service providers.58  There is a 
 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. See Pascucci, supra note 44. 
 54. See Colvin, supra note 44, at 12. 
 55. In-depth discussion of arbitration clauses is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 56. Alternative Dispute Resolution, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last updated June 8, 2017) 
(“As burgeoning court queues, rising costs of litigation, and time delays continue to plague 
litigants, more states have begun experimenting with ADR programs.”). 
 57. See generally Barbara Kate Repa, Arbitration Pros and Cons, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (last visited Apr. 
26, 2021). 
 58. See, e.g., JAMS, jamsadr.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); AM. ARB. ASS’N, adr.org 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2021); CPR, https://www.cpradr.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
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rapidly growing list of ADR service providers,59 but the three most 
commonly used service providers in the country are the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), the International Institute for Conflict 
Prevention & Resolution (CPR), and JAMS.60  Of these three 
organizations, two are non-profit.61  AAA and CPR each operate as non-
profit organizations, which makes JAMS unique among its competitors 
by operating as a for-profit business.62  Collectively, these organizations 
have handled thousands of cases and employ hundreds of full-time third-
party neutrals.63  Despite the significant collective market share of the 
three largest organizations, there is enough demand for ADR neutrals in 
the market to support many other service providers as well.64  Still, in 
comparison to the three, other providers are typically much smaller and 
are less equipped to handle the volume and variety of ADR services than 
the three aforementioned ones.65  As a result, the big three are the 
preferred providers for many of the nation’s largest businesses.66   
2. Rules Applicable to Arbitrators 
The rules and procedures of arbitration may differ from trial, and at 
times are far looser, but arbitration is nonetheless subject to its own 
restrictions.67  One of the notable differences is that anyone can be an 
arbitrator, with or without a law degree or legal expertise, which is a 
stark departure from the requirements of judgeship.68  While this is 
generally the case, there are situations in which an arbitrator must meet 
specific subject matter qualifications that do not apply to judges.69 
For example, in the context of mandatory arbitration clauses, the 
clause may stipulate that an arbitrator must come from a particular pool 
 
 59. See Dispute Resolution Rosters List, A.B.A., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DR_Rosters_List/ (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 60. See David McLean, US Arbitral Institutions and Their Rules, LATHAM & WATKINS 
LLP, https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/us-arbitral-institutions-and-their-rules (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 61. See CPR, supra note 58; About the AAA and ICDR, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/about (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 62. See CPR, supra note 58; see About the AAA and ICDR, supra note 61. 
 63. See McLean, supra note 60, at 1. 
 64. See JUNE R. LEHRMAN & EDITH C. SCHAFFER, CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS BUS. 
TRANSACTIONS § 14:4 (2020). 
 65. See generally Dispute Resolution Rosters List, supra note 59. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Pascucci, supra note 44. 
 68. See Ken LaMance, Who Can Be an Arbitrator?, LEGALMATCH, 
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/choosing-an-arbitrator.html (last updated 
Apr. 18, 2018, 2:34 PM). 
 69. Id. 
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of candidates with relevant expertise relating to the nature of the 
dispute.70  Non-lawyers are technically qualified to conduct certain kinds 
of arbitration,71 and the parties to a dispute may prefer an arbitrator with 
a specific type of expertise.72  One of the potential benefits of arbitration 
over trial is that an arbitrator is selected and agreed upon by both parties, 
allowing them to choose an arbitrator they believe is equipped to 
understand and adequately adjudicate their dispute.73  Conversely, the 
greater level of randomness in the selection of judges that will hear a 
case may create a more neutral environment.74 
In sum, the process for selecting an arbitrator is ultimately up to the 
parties to the dispute.75  Rather than relying on longstanding, more 
fastidious rules such as those applicable to trial, the parties to an 
arbitration are the masters of their own proceeding and are free to 
manage it in any way they see fit.76 
i. Rules of ADR Service Providers 
Although the rules of arbitration are ultimately up to the parties, 
many ADR service providers have established their own rules applicable 
to all arbitrations conducted by their organization.77  Presumably, this 
streamlines the process and allows prospective customers to review the 
details of the process before formally beginning the proceedings or 
selecting an ADR service provider.78  As an illustration, the JAMS 
website devotes an entire homepage tab to rules and clauses for their 
ADR services.79  Under JAMS’ rules and clauses options, they provide 
detailed information regarding their general rules of arbitration.80  
 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See What is Arbitration?, FIND L., https://adr.findlaw.com/arbitration/what-is-
arbitration-.html (last updated June 20, 2016) (“Arbitrators can also be required to be experts 
in the field or industry involved in a dispute, whereas a judge may or may not have such 
expertise. On the flip side, some would suggest that this randomness and lack of selection is 
a plus for litigation, as judges have no reason to worry about whether they will ever be ‘picked’ 
to decide another case for the parties before them.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., JAMS ADR Rules & Clauses, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/adr-rules-
procedures/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); What We Do, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://adr.org/arbitration (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); Arbitration, CPR, 
https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/arbitration (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See JAMS Rules & Clauses, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/adr-rules-procedures/ 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 80. See id. 
 
850 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
JAMS’ comprehensive arbitration is subject to thirty-four rules,81 
compared to the twenty-eight rules listed for their streamlined arbitration 
format.82  The rules cover topics ranging from service requirements to 
sanctions, resembling the rules of civil procedure for the courts in many 
ways.83  While many of the JAMS arbitration rules cover similar issues 
as rules of civil procedure, they are clearly dwarfed by both number and 
depth when compared to rules of civil procedure.84  Certainly, one of the 
major benefits of arbitration is its simplified process,85 and the JAMS 
rules seem to support that notion.  However, this simplification comes at 
the cost of certain rights and protections that exist for litigants.86 
The well-established process used in JAMS arbitrations, along with 
the similar processes practiced by other large ADR providers,87 is likely 
one of the driving forces behind the success of the top ADR service 
providers.88  In fact, a substantial portion of the JAMS rules cover 
arbitration clauses.89  This is unsurprising given the vast number of 
arbitrations that organizations like JAMS manage that stem from 
arbitration clauses.90 
Organizations like JAMS handle such a large number of 
arbitrations that some parties are bound to dispute the outcome.  JAMS 
has several rules in place to address this.91  First, JAMS has an informal 
appeal process for arbitration awards.92  However, the JAMS appeal 
process is vastly different from the rules of appeal in civil procedure.93  
 
 81. See JAMS, JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2014), 
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf. 
 82. See JAMS, JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2014), 
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMS_streamlined_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf. 
 83. See id.; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. (establishing the process parties and courts must follow 
when engaging in or conducting civil litigation.). 
 84. JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 82; cf. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 
 85. See ADR Types and Benefits, supra note 11. 
 86. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 38 (right to a jury); FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (judgement as a 
matter of law); FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (new trial). 
 87. See, e.g., Rules, Forms & Fees, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/Rules (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 88. See, e.g., Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 
2019). 
 89. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81. 
 90. See Consumer Case Information, JAMS, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/consumercases/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). 
 91. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81. 
 92. JAMS, JAMS OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE (2003), 
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMS_Optional_Appeal_Procedures-2003.pdf. 
 93. See id.; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (summons). 
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The most noteworthy difference is that an appeal of a JAMS arbitration 
award is optional, requiring the consent of both parties before it may be 
processed.94  This hardly resembles an appeal process, and the ability to 
appeal an arbitration award is extremely limited at best.95 
Second, JAMS provides no procedure for vacating an arbitration 
award.96  Rather than providing customers an opportunity to seek vacatur 
of the arbitration award, JAMS relies on the applicable state and federal 
rules of vacatur.97 
Finally, the JAMS arbitration rules list few disclosure requirements 
for its arbitrators.98  The rules mainly specify the manner in which the 
disclosures will be made, and only briefly mention disclosures “required 
by law.”99  Not only is this provision ambiguous, it is also unclear 
whether the disclosures “required by law” will be made at all.100  The 
provision follows “required by law” with the language, “or within ten 
(10) calendar days . . . .”101  In addition to the confusing and disjunctive 
disclosure requirements applicable to the arbitrator, the parties and their 
representatives are required to disclose any risks that are likely to cause 
impartiality on the part of the arbitrator.102  Curiously, the rules appear 
to put the brunt of the disclosure requirements on the parties themselves, 
even with respect to the risk of the arbitrator’s own impartiality.103 
Given the limitations of JAMS’ rules of arbitration, parties may 
only have the ability to challenge an arbitration award through pre-
existing law, such as statutes, rules of civil procedure, and Canons of 
Judicial Ethics.104 
 
 94. See JAMS OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE, supra note 92, at 3. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81, 
at 29-30. 
 97. See id. at 29 (“Proceedings to enforce, confirm, modify or vacate an Award will be 
controlled by and conducted in conformity with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec 1, 
et seq., or applicable state law. The Parties to an Arbitration under these Rules shall be deemed 
to have consented that judgment upon the Award may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof.”). 
 98. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81, 
at 17 (“Any disclosures regarding the selected Arbitrator shall be made as required by law or 
within ten (10) calendar days from the date of appointment.”). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. (“Any disclosures regarding the selected Arbitrator shall be made as required by 
law or within ten (10) calendar days from the date of appointment.”). 
 102. See id. at 17-18 (“The Parties and their representatives shall disclose to JAMS any 
circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the Arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence, including any bias or any financial or personal interest in the result of the 
Arbitration or any past or present relationship with the Parties or their representatives.”). 
 103. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 81. 
 104. See id. at 17-18; see, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 638 (2003); Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges, at canon 2, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-
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ii. Rules for Vacating an Arbitration Award 
Even without the opportunity to seek a correction or vacatur of an 
arbitration award through the arbitration service provider’s rules, parties 
may take advantage of both federal and state statutes that do give them 
that opportunity.105  Specifically, the Federal and California rules each 
provide a basis for correcting or overturning an arbitration award—albeit 
on a much more limited basis than is available through appeals of trial 
court rulings.106  California requires arbitrators to disclose “all matters 
that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a 
doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be 
impartial.”107  The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides grounds for 
vacatur of an arbitration award when there is “evident partiality.”108  
When applied, the federal rule requires arbitrators to disclose any facts 
“that might create an impression of possible bias.”109  Functionally, both 
rules are similar but not identical.110 
Generally, a district court must “take the award as it finds it,” with 
only a limited ability to vacate or modify the award.111  There is a general 
rule of deference when an arbitration award is brought before the 
court.112  However, courts have nonetheless been willing to vacate or 
modify arbitration awards on the basis of evident partiality.113 
3. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages 
The evolution of ADR and the challenges it raises are well 
exemplified in the Ninth Circuit’s recent Monster Energy case.114  This 
case involved a dispute between Monster Energy Company (Monster) 
 
united-states-judges#c (last visited Apr. 26, 2021) (“Respect for Law. A judge should respect 
and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”). 
 105. See Procedures and Grounds for Requesting a U.S. District Court to Correct an 
Arbitration Award or Vacate an Arbitration Award Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 
WOLFF L. OFF. (2013), https://www.wolfflaw.com/procedures-and-grounds-for-requesting-
a-u-s-district-court-to-co.html [hereinafter Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration 
Award]. 
 106. See id. 
 107. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.9(a) (2003) (emphasis added). 
 108. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2002). 
 109. See Commonwealth Coatings Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 110. See Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration Award, supra note 105 (“The 
grounds for a Court to vacate or correct an Arbitration Award are similar-but not identical-
under the California and Federal Arbitration Acts.”). 
 111. Legion Ins. Corp. v. VCW, Inc., 198 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 112. See Teamsters Local 853 v. J.C. Paper, Nos. C-09-04671 EDL, C-08-2464 EDL., 
2010 WL 625354, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 113. See, e.g., Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th 
Cir. 2019); Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150. 
 114. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130. 
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and City Beverages, doing business as Olympic Eagle Distributing 
(Olympic Eagle).115  In 2006, Olympic Eagle signed a twenty year 
contract with Monster, under which Olympic Eagle would promote and 
sell Monster products.116  The contract included a provision that allowed 
Monster to terminate the agreement without cause, provided they pay 
Olympic Eagle a severance fee.117  Monster terminated the contract 
before the conclusion of the contractual period, leading Olympic Eagle 
to use Washington state law in an attempt to prohibit Monster’s 
termination without cause.118  In response, Monster compelled 
arbitration of the dispute through the arbitration clause included in its 
contracts with distributors.119  The arbitration clause designated JAMS 
Orange County as the administrator of the arbitration.120  Upon the 
commencement of the mandatory arbitration proceedings, JAMS 
provided both parties with a list of seven arbitrators to choose from.121  
After the parties agreed on a candidate, the arbitrator provided a 
disclosure statement.122  The arbitrator’s disclosure statement said, in 
part: 
I practice in association with JAMS.  Each JAMS neutral, including 
me, has an economic interest in the overall financial success of 
JAMS.  In addition, because of the nature and size of JAMS, the 
parties should assume that one or more of the other neutrals who 
practice with JAMS has participated in an arbitration, mediation or 
other dispute resolution proceeding with the parties, counsel or 
insurers in this case and may do so in the future.123 
Following the completion of arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator 
ruled in favor of Monster and awarded attorneys’ fees.124  Soon after, 
Monster sought to confirm the award.125  In response, Olympic Eagle 
petitioned for vacatur on the basis of its later discovery that the arbitrator 
was a co-owner of JAMS.126  In addition, Olympic Eagle requested 
information about the arbitrator’s financial interest in JAMS and 
Monster’s relationship with JAMS.127  Initially unsuccessful in its 
 
 115. Id. at 1132. 
 116. Id. at 1132-33. 
 117. Id. at 1133. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130. 
 120. Id. at 1133. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1133. 
 127. Id. 
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discovery request, Olympic Eagle served JAMS with a subpoena before 
the dispute was eventually brought before a federal district court.128  The 
district court confirmed the arbitration award and awarded Monster 
attorneys’ fees.129  Olympic Eagle appealed the court’s decision, 
bringing the case before the Ninth Circuit.130  Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the arbitrator failed to disclose his ownership interest 
in JAMS,131 in violation of federal law.132  The court based its decision 
on the grounds that the arbitrator’s ownership interest in JAMS, in 
conjunction with JAMS’ extensive business history with Monster, 
established a “reasonable impression of bias.”133 
The Ninth Circuit’s reversal and grant of vacatur in this case has 
the potential to significantly impact the practice of ADR.134  Monster 
Energy is one of the few cases to address the paradox of Repeat Player 
Bias.135  If Monster Energy is any indication, it appears that, at the very 
least, rules of impartiality will be more strictly enforced in the future.136 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
The central issues that the Ninth Circuit set out to address in 
Monster Energy involved an arbitrator’s disclosure obligations and the 
risk of Repeat Player Bias.137  The Repeat Player Effect is, in part, the 
notion that frequent customers of an ADR service provider have an 
inherent advantage over a non-repeat opposing party to the 
proceeding.138  The prevalence of arbitration clauses within employment 
and business contracts calls for a closer look into the fairness of ADR in 
those environments.139  Given the rapid growth of ADR and arbitration 
clauses, it is not surprising to believe that businesses have been 
 
 128. See id. 
 129. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1138. 
 132. See Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration Award, supra note 105 (stating 
that courts have statutory authority under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) to vacate an arbitration award 
“where there was evident partiality . . . in the arbitrators.”). 
 133. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1138. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 1134. 
 136. See id. at 1141-42 (Friedland, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id. at 1138. 
 138. See Edward Silverman, The Suspicious Existence of the “Repeat Player Effect” in 
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, NAT. L. REV. (2013), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/suspicious-existence-repeat-player-effect-mandatory-
arbitration-employment-disputes. 
 139. See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
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motivated to include arbitration clauses in their contracts because they 
receive benefits from partaking in arbitration as opposed to trial.140  
While there is an argument to be made that the benefits from arbitration 
clauses equally apply to both parties, the existence of Repeat Player Bias 
may tip the scales in the favor of one party over the other.141 
In determining the risk of impartiality in arbitration proceedings, 
the nature of the relationship between arbitrators and the parties to the 
dispute is an important consideration.142  The financial interest the 
arbitrator has in his associated business is also relevant.143  While these 
factors provide some guidance in determining the risk of evident 
partiality, there is no bright-line rule when applying these factors to the 
facts.144  Given the fact-specific requirements for a finding of evident 
partiality resulting in vacatur, many parties subject to an arbitration 
clause are unsure of their rights and potential remedies should they find 
themselves arbitrating against the other party to the contract.145  Despite 
the Ninth Circuit in Monster Energy recently laying out the requirements 
for vacating an arbitration award on the basis of evident partiality more 
clearly, it has yet to be seen whether the current rules and the extent of 
their enforcement go far enough to ensure adequacy and fairness in ADR 
proceedings.146 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The court’s holding in Monster Energy provides substantial 
guidance for applying the Federal Arbitration Act.147  The FAA’s text, 
stating that vacatur of an award is proper “where there was evident 
partiality . . . in the arbitrators,” hardly establishes a pragmatic solution 
to the risk of arbitrator partiality.148 
This section will first discuss the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Monster 
Energy.149  Second, this section will consider whether the court correctly 
 
 140. See id. (“By inserting individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number of 
consumer and employment contracts, companies like American Express devised a way to 
circumvent the courts and bar people from joining together in class-action lawsuits, 
realistically the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices.”). 
 141. See id.; see also Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1134. 
 142. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1138. 
 143. Id. at 1136. 
 144. See Kathryn A. Windsor, Defining Arbitrator Evidentiary Partiality: The Catch-22 
of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191, 198-99 (2009). 
 145. See Silverman, supra note 138. 
 146. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135. 
 147. See id. at 1133-34, 1135-38. 
 148. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2002). 
 149. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1132. 
 
856 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
applied the rules of vacatur,150 and evaluate whether the rules sufficiently 
address major concerns surrounding arbitration proceedings.151 
A. The Ninth Circuit Rationale in Monster Energy 
In Monster Energy, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the 
Federal Arbitration Act152  permitted a court to vacate the arbitration 
award resulting from the dispute between Monster Energy and Olympic 
Eagle.153  Olympic Eagle argued that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose 
his ownership interest in JAMS supported vacatur of the award, whereas 
Monster contended that Olympic Eagle waived its impartiality claim by 
failing to timely object following its receipt of the arbitrator’s 
disclosures.154 
In addressing Monster’s waiver claim, the court applied a 
constructive knowledge standard155 to consider whether a party had 
waived an evident partiality claim.156  The court previously found that 
failure to request disclosures may constitute waiver.157  However, the 
court distinguished this case from others by characterizing the 
arbitrator’s disclosure statement as a “partial disclosure.”158  The court 
acknowledged that the arbitrator’s ownership interest was, in fact, a type 
of economic interest, and the arbitrator had explicitly disclosed his 
general economic interest in JAMS.159  However, the arbitrator’s 
disclosure of his general economic interest did not constitute 
constructive notice of his potential non-neutrality.160  The arbitrator’s 
disclosure not only left out any indication of his ownership interest, but 
likened his economic interest to the same interest of every other JAMS 
neutral.161 
In addition to mentioning his general economic interest in JAMS, 
the arbitrator disclosed his own personal previous dealings with Monster 
as a neutral.162  However, his disclosure also claimed that his economic 
interest extended only to the matters where he had served as a neutral in 
 
 150. Id.; see also Requesting to Correct or Vacate an Arbitration Award, supra note 105. 
 151. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d. at 1133-38. 
 152. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (2002). 
 153. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1132-34. 
 154. Id. at 1134. 
 155. Id.; see, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 156. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1134. 
 157. See Fidelity Federal Bank, 386 F.3d at 1313. 
 158. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1134. 
 159. See id. 
 160. Id. at 1134-35. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
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disputes involving Monster.163  That was inaccurate because, as a co-
owner of JAMS, the arbitrator received a direct economic benefit from 
ADR services performed by other JAMS neutrals involving Monster.164  
Monster argued that information relating to JAMS’ ownership structure 
and case history were publicly available on the JAMS website.165  
However, the JAMS website fails to provide clear and comprehensive 
information answering Olympic Eagle’s initial questions.166  Regardless 
of the public availability of information that may provide notice of a risk 
of impartiality, the court emphasized “an arbitrator’s duty to investigate 
and disclose potential conflicts.”167  Therefore, to expect Olympic Eagle 
to have identified all relevant information that was not disclosed by the 
arbitrator is to put the burden of the arbitrator’s own disclosures on the 
parties.168  The court stated that a finding of waiver in this case would 
“put a premium on concealment,” incentivizing arbitrator’s to withhold 
information that may disqualify them.169 
Turning to the evident partiality issue,170 the court looked to 
Commonwealth Coatings171 in its analysis.172  That case required vacatur 
of an arbitration award where the arbitrator failed to “disclose to the 
parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.”173  
On its face, this rule seems extremely broad.174  Adopting a more 
narrowly tailored approach to the rule, the Ninth Circuit asserted that 
“long past, attenuated, or insubstantial connections between a party and 
an arbitrator” do not support vacatur on the basis of evident partiality.175  
 
 163. See id. at 1135. 
 164. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1136. 
 165. See Answering Brief of Appellee Monster Energy Co.—Under Seal at 33, 35, City 
Beverages LLC v. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-55813). 
 166. See Consumer Case Information, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/consumercases/ 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2021); see also JAMS Leadership, JAMS, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/jams-senior-management/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2021) (illustrating 
that, of the information available, none of it indicates the nature or extent of any JAMS 
owners’ economic interest in the organization or its conducted arbitrations). 
 167. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135 (citing New Regency v. Nippon Herald Films, 
501 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (2002). 
 171. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 172. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135. 
 173. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 
(1968)). It is important to note that Commonwealth Coatings did not establish a standard for 
“evident partiality” that received a majority vote, causing some circuits to implement the 
standard from Justice Black’s plurality opinion and others to use Justice White’s concurring 
opinion. Here, in the Monster Energy case, the Ninth Circuit pulls from elements of both 
opinions. 
 174. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149. 
 175. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135. 
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To reconcile the lack of clarity from the previously established rules, the 
court synthesized them into a single, more manageable rule.176  This rule 
states that, “to support vacatur of an arbitration award, the arbitrator’s 
undisclosed interest in an entity must be substantial, and that entity’s 
business dealings with a party to the arbitration must be nontrivial.”177  
In essence, the court identified two requirements: (1) an arbitrator’s 
undisclosed interest must be substantial, and (2) related business 
dealings with a party must be nontrivial.178 
In applying this rule to the facts of this case, the Ninth Circuit held 
that both requirements were clearly met.179  Framed in the context of the 
case, the court asked (1) “whether the Arbitrator’s ownership interest in 
JAMS was sufficiently substantial,” and (2) “whether JAMS and 
Monster were engaged in nontrivial business dealings.”180  The arbitrator 
did disclose that he had previously served as a neutral arbitrator in a 
dispute where Monster was a party, but nonetheless opted not to disclose 
his ownership interest in the JAMS organization.181  This was significant 
because the arbitrator’s status as a co-owner of JAMS entitled him to a 
portion of profits across all JAMS arbitrations, not just the ones that the 
arbitrator conducted himself.182  The court found that the arbitrator’s 
ownership interest was substantial given that the interest “greatly 
exceeds the economic interest that all JAMS neutrals naturally have in 
the organization.”183 
In addressing the second question regarding the trivial nature of 
related business dealings, the court inquired about the Monster’s form 
contracts.184  It found that each of Monster’s form contracts contained an 
arbitration clause designating JAMS Orange County as the service 
provider.185  Consequently, JAMS had administered ninety-seven 
arbitrations for Monster as of October 2019, averaging over one 
arbitration per month.186  The court labeled that level of business 
interaction as clearly nontrivial.187 
 
 176. See id. at 1135-36. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. at 1136 (“Our inquiry is thus two-fold: we must determine (1) whether the 
Arbitrator’s ownership interest in JAMS was sufficiently substantial, and (2) whether JAMS 
and Monster were engaged in nontrivial business dealings. If the answer to both questions is 
affirmative, then the relationship required disclosure, and supports vacatur.”). 
 179. See id. at 1132. 
 180. See id. at 1136. 
 181. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1136. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d 1130. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 1136. 
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On these grounds, the court found that the arbitrator had a 
“substantial interest in [JAMS,] which has done more than trivial 
business with [Monster].”188  This finding resulted in vacatur of the 
arbitration award, noting that the facts created an impression of bias and 
should have been disclosed.189 
B. Application of Rules of Vacatur and Policy Rationale 
The court’s application of the two-pronged analysis provides much 
needed clarity and will likely serve as precedent for vacatur on the basis 
of partiality in future cases involving similar facts.190  This test fits neatly 
within the “evident partiality” framework provided by Commonwealth 
Coatings,191 and only serves to supplement its application.192 
Although the Monster Energy case formally addresses only the 
federal rules, the court allotted a sizeable portion of its holding to a 
discussion of comparable rules of vacatur at the state level.193  In its 
discussion, the court mentioned the rules adopted by several states 
within its jurisdiction.194  One focus centered on the state rules’ 
comparisons with judge disqualification.195  For instance, the previously 
mentioned California rule’s disclosure requirements include the 
existence of any ground for disqualification of a judge.196  Montana’s 
rule disclosure contains a similar requirement, stating that mandatory 
disclosure requirements must include any ground for the disqualification 
of a judge.197  In addition, the court mentions the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act (RUAA), which contains rules of arbitration that states 
can and have chosen to adopt.198  RUAA “establishes a presumption of 
evident partiality when the arbitrator does not disclose a ‘known, direct 
and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a 
known, existing and substantial relationship with a party . . . .’ ” 199  
Under any of these rules, the JAMS arbitrator in Monster Energy would 
be subject to even stricter disclosure rules.200 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 1136. 
 190. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1132-38. 
 191. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). 
 192. See generally Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1135. 
 193. See id. at 1137-38. 
 194. See id. at 1136. 
 195. Id. at 1136-37. 
 196. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.9(a) (2002). 
 197. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-116(4)(a) (2019). 
 198. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1137. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See generally id. 
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As the court points out, the aforementioned state rules subject 
arbitrators to disclosure rules that are “akin to, or more burdensome than, 
the easily satisfied obligations we set forth here,” adding that “these 
disclosure requirements safeguard the parties’ right to be aware of the 
relevant information to assess the arbitrator’s neutrality.”201  The court’s 
discussion of these alternative rules serves as an acknowledgement of 
the prevalence of arbitration.202  Notably, in dicta, the court stated that 
the United States has become an “arbitration nation.”203  As such, the 
rules of arbitration must continue to be improved over time. 
C. Sufficiency of the Rules 
The rules of arbitration vary by jurisdiction, but some rules seem to 
address the controversy surrounding arbitration with more clarity than 
others.204  The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Monster Energy provided much 
needed clarity to the application of the Federal Arbitration Act and 
related precedent.205  The lack of specificity in the FAA is certainly a 
concern.206  There is significant room for varying interpretations of the 
statute, as demonstrated by the split among the circuits in their specific 
evident partiality standards.207  This lack of clarity is a concern for a 
growing number of participants in arbitration and other forms of ADR.208 
One possibility is that federal courts will establish enough 
precedent in interpreting the FAA to create a more uniform 
understanding and application of the rules.  After all, the FAA is 
certainly not the only statute with exceedingly broad provisions,209 and 
laws must frequently evolve to address the particular subjects they are 
designed to regulate.  As such, there is an opportunity to either 
supplement the FAA through case law or to amend it to provide greater 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. at 1137-38. 
 203. Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1130. 
 204. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.9(a) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-
116(4)(a) (2019); Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1137. 
 205. See Monster Energy Co., 940 F.3d at 1133-38. 
 206. See, e.g., id. 
 207. See generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44960.pdf; see also Seung-Woon Lee, Arbitrator’s Evident 
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context.210  Given that the FAA is roughly a century old and still lacks 
the needed clarity, it may be time for the Supreme Court to hear a second 
case involving the FAA’s evident partiality requirements, with 
Commonwealth Coatings being the only one to date.211 
D. Potential for Bias Following Monster Energy 
Looking at the facts of Monster Energy, the potential for bias is 
clear.212  When an arbitrator has an ownership interest in his ADR 
organization, he directly benefits from the success of that 
organization.213  That fact, in isolation, is not evidence of bias.  But the 
record in Monster Energy demonstrated that the profitability of JAMS, 
and the arbitrator’s share of those profits, were tied directly to the 
continuation of its ongoing and extensive business relationship with 
Monster Energy.214  Based on the evidence in that case, JAMS neutrals 
had handled no less than ninety-seven other arbitration proceedings to 
which Monster Energy was a party in the preceding five years, an 
average of at least one arbitration per month.215  That income was 
generated only because Monster Energy had chosen to require JAMS as 
the arbitration provider for any disputes arising under any of its 
distributorship contracts.216  Considering the rates charged by JAMS and 
the unusually high volume of such proceedings, the revenue produced 
by JAMS’ relationship with Monster Energy was clearly substantial.  As 
the court noted, “[s]uch a rate of business dealing is hardly trivial, 
regardless of the exact profit-share that the Arbitrator obtained.”217  That 
share of profits would necessarily be jeopardized if Monster Energy 
became dissatisfied with JAMS and decided to designate a different 
provider in its arbitration clauses.  Based on those facts, it is hardly 
surprising that the court concluded: “these facts demonstrate that the 
Arbitrator had a ‘substantial interest in [JAMS,] which has done more 
than trivial business with [Monster]’—facts that create an impression of 
bias, should have been disclosed, and therefore support vacatur.”218 
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This is not to say that the arbitrator was incapable of serving as an 
entirely unbiased neutral, but his ability to do so is not the relevant 
question.  Disclosure requirements are not meant to measure an 
individual’s ability to remain neutral.  Rather, such requirements exist to 
allow the parties to evaluate the risk or appearance of partiality and 
decide for themselves whether they want to attempt to mitigate that risk 
by selecting another candidate.219  By withholding important information 
regarding his position within JAMS, and JAMS’ relationship with 
Monster, the arbitrator deprived Olympic Eagle of the opportunity to 
conduct its own risk assessment.220 
When comparing the FAA to several state statutes,221 it appears as 
though some of these alternative rules plainly liken an arbitrator’s 
disclosure requirements to a sitting judge’s disclosure requirements, 
while still allowing appropriate experts to arbitrate.222  Presumably, this 
similarity is in recognition of the significance of impartiality and the 
analogous relationship between ADR and trial.  ADR has served an 
important purpose in the American legal system by being more 
accessible than litigation and by mitigating the case overload that many 
courts experience.223 
However, in many instances the system falls short as an alternative 
to litigation.  One of the key aspects of the American judicial system is 
its impartiality.224  It should be expected that participation in ADR 
involves foregoing many of the rules and requirements applicable to 
litigation, but the challenge seems to be striking the proper balance.  For 
ADR to maintain its current advantages over litigation the process must 
continue to exist as a streamlined process.  However, it is necessary to 
put a limit on the extent to which ADR procedures disregard the careful 
considerations of the judicial system.  There are a variety of concerns 
surrounding arbitration,225 but an overabundance of arbitrator 
disclosures is not one of them. 
There is a possibility that the concerns surrounding arbitration are 
so deeply intertwined with the prevalence of arbitration clauses that any 
solution that does not address the issue of arbitration clauses directly will 
be insufficient.  Although possible, this hardly justifies the complete 
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disregard of ADR rules that are indirectly related to arbitration clauses.  
In fact, providing clearer grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award 
would likely provide parties that are typically seen as “victims” of an 
arbitration clause an opportunity to challenge the potentially biased 
award.226  Besides, arbitration clauses are not the only source of 
arbitrated disputes.227  Even if arbitration clauses were somehow limited, 
or even eliminated altogether, arbitrations would still be the preferred 
option for some parties.228  As such, there is more than enough reason to 
address Repeat Player Bias through disclosure requirements to improve 
the integrity of ADR as a whole. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The growing prevalence of arbitration, and the resulting increase in 
the power and influence that repeat players can wield over the ADR 
providers who depend on them for business, requires immediate action 
by courts and legislatures to ensure that all litigants are provided with a 
fair dispute resolution process.229  That objective could be accomplished 
by imposing clear, unambiguous, and uniform standards for arbitrators, 
comparable to those imposed on judges. 
In order to accomplish that goal, and address the risks of potential 
bias among third-party neutrals, the extent of an arbitrator’s disclosure 
requirements must be explicit and thorough so that the parties may move 
forward with confidence in the impartiality of the process.230  The rules 
applicable to judges are meant to mitigate the risk of impartiality as 
much as practicable, and there seems to be little reason why arbitrators 
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should not be subject to a similar standard with respect to disclosures.231  
For this reason, the Ninth Circuit was apt to recognize Justice White’s 
concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings: 
The arbitration process functions best when an amicable and trusting 
atmosphere is preserved and there is voluntary compliance with the 
decree, without need for judicial enforcement.  This end is best 
served by establishing an atmosphere of frankness at the outset, 
through disclosure by the arbitrator of any financial transactions 
which he has had or is negotiating with either of the parties . . . .  The 
judiciary should minimize its role in arbitration as judge of the 
arbitrator’s impartiality.  That role is best consigned to the parties, 
who are the architects of their own arbitration process, and are far 
better informed of the prevailing ethical standards and reputations 
within their business.232 
In applying Justice White’s rationale, arbitrators should be 
uniformly required to disclose any information that any party might 
reasonably believe contributes to a risk of impartiality, even if it strays 
slightly from Justice White’s preferred, but underdeveloped standard.233  
The Monster Energy decision highlights the critical importance of 
establishing more rigorous and unambiguous standards for disclosure, as 
arbitration becomes more prevalent and as ADR service providers 
become more vulnerable to the power and influence of repeat players.  
No party to a court proceeding need ever be concerned that a judge’s 
salary is dependent on the outcome of the case. 
Increasingly, private contractual arbitration is being used to resolve 
disputes involving parties with markedly unequal bargaining power.234  
Additionally, such disputes are being resolved by arbitrators with largely 
unlimited authority, subject only to extremely limited review, and who 
remain vulnerable to influences that may undermine the fairness that 
should be expected from the legal system.235  In this system, the playing 
field is not necessarily level when one party provides a significant 
amount of income for the arbitrator or the provider for which they work, 
while the other is a party that the arbitrator will likely never see again.236 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The lack of disclosure requirements for arbitrators has led to the 
growing problem of evident partiality and Repeat Player Bias in ADR 
proceedings.  Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC serves as a 
significant, yet incomplete, contribution to address these problems.237  
Although the rule the court adhered to is meant to provide some clarity 
and guidance regarding a neutral arbitrator’s disclosure requirements 
and the grounds for vacating an arbitration award, the court refrained 
from harmonizing disclosure requirements of arbitrators with the 
requirements applicable to judges.238  Considering ADR is generally 
distinct from the court system in that it is conducted by private 
individuals and organizations, the extent to which the risk of repeat 
player bias can be mitigated is likely very limited.  However, parties to 
an arbitration should have the right to evaluate any risk of impartiality 
themselves by having access to an arbitrator’s disclosures akin to those 
required by judges.  Until issues of evident partiality and Repeat Player 
Bias garner more attention among courts and legislatures, the supposed 
impartial nature of arbitrations will diminish as the industry continues to 
grow. 
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